



OST CENTRAL BANKS CONDUCT MONETARY POLICY BY MANIPULATING SHORT-TERM INTEREST
RATES TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN POLICY OBJECTIVES, SUCH AS ECONOMIC GROWTH AND LOW
INFLATION. BY MOST ACCOUNTS THE FEDERAL RESERVE HAS BEEN REMARKABLY SUC-
CESSFUL DURING THE PAST TWO DECADES AT ACHIEVING THESE GOALS. THE LENGTH OF
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the economic expansion from 1982 to 1990 and from
1991 to 2001 is unprecedented in U.S. history. In
addition, inflation has fallen sharply since the 1970s,
averaging less than 3 percent during the past
decade. Looking back over this period, Taylor (1998)
calls it the “Great Boom” in U.S. economic history.
The Fed’s approach to policy was not always as
successful as recent experience suggests, however.
It was the Fed’s policy of controlling short-term
interest rates—more specifically, the federal funds
rate—that gave rise to the sustained inflation that
began in the early 1960s and ran through the early
1980s.1 Indeed, this dismal track record increased
interest in an alternative policy, one that focused
more on the growth rate of the money supply. The
basic idea behind this alternative policy, usually put
under the umbrella name of “monetarism,” was that,
by controlling the growth of the money supply and
not interest rates, the Fed could better control infla-
tion and foster stable economic growth.
The power of monetarist arguments and the
building empirical evidence supporting them were
key factors leading up to the Fed’s October 1979
announcement that it would place more weight on
the monetary aggregates in policy deliberations.
The Fed’s apparent romance with an aggregates-
based policy was short-lived, however. Citing the
unusual behavior of money growth, in October 1982
the Fed abandoned monetary targets as operating
guides and returned to targeting the federal funds
R.W. HAFER
Hafer chairs the department of economics and finance
and is the director of the Office of Economic Education
and Business Research at Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville; he is also a visiting scholar at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta. He thanks Gerald Dwyer, Robert
Hetzel, Garett Jones, Mack Ott, and Anna Schwartz for
comments and criticisms on an earlier version of this
paper presented at the Western Economics Association
meetings in San Francisco in July 2001.
In economics as in other developing sciences, change erodes the value of
popular terminology. Monetarism is a name that has been given to a particular
set of propositions at a particular point of time. Like Keynesianism, fiscalism,
or the “Treasury view,” the particular set of propositions called monetarism
does not fully describe the body of thought accepted by a loosely knit group
of practicing economists any more than terms like Chicago, Cambridge or
Austrian School describe the thought of all to whom the terms are applied.
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rate. Indeed, today monetary growth targets play no
official role in the setting of U.S. monetary policy. The
fact that money plays no role is not new in the history
of U.S. policymaking.2 The question is whether such
disregard is justified by the data any more today than
it was in the past.
This article addresses that question by discussing
the development and apparent failure of monetarism
as a guide to policy. This overview is useful because it
puts today’s disregard of monetary aggregates as pol-
icy tools into a historical perspective. The article also
presents some empirical analysis using a sample of
fifteen countries to explore whether the basic mone-
tarist propositions still hold true. Before delving into
these discussions and analysis, the article first pro-
vides a working definition of monetarism.
What Is Monetarism?
I
n its most generic form, monetarism is the term
often used to describe a view or a body of work
in which changes in the growth rates of the mon-
etary aggregates play a central role in explaining
economic activity, including changes in income
(nominal and real) and prices. This view is directly
linked to the quantity theory of money. To see this
link, let
(1) M = kY,
where M represents the nominal money stock, k is the
public’s desired ratio of money holdings to nominal
income, and Yis nominal income. The so-calledk-ratio
is key to understanding the behavioral relationship
between the money stock, income, and prices. If this
ratio is constant, then M and Y move proportionally.
If M is viewed as the nominal stock of money bal-
ances demanded by the public, equation (1) is a sim-
ple money demand function, where money demand
depends largely on income.
The usefulness of equation (1) is demonstrated by
a scenario in which the economy is in equilibrium,
defined as a condition in which the quantity of
money balances demanded is equal to the quantity
supplied. If this condition holds, then any increase in
the nominal stock of money (M) leads to an increase
in either k or Y. If individuals do not initially alter
their desired money-to-income ratio (k), an increase
in the money stock leads directly to an increase in
nominal income. Writing equation (1) in growth rate
terms leads one to the following proposition: increas-
ing the growth rate of the money stock leads to an
increase in the growth rate of nominal income.
This proposition is important to understanding the
nature of monetarism. First, the proposition suggests
that movements in the money stock lead to similar
movements in nominal income. If the money stock is
by and large influenced by the actions of the mone-
tary authority—the Federal Reserve System in the
United States or the European Central Bank in
Europe—then policy actions have predictable effects
on the economy. Of course, how closely money and
nominal income move together is the subject of much
ongoing debate and empirical testing.
Second, equation (1) also suggests, as a matter of
arithmetic, that changes in money can affect both
real income and prices differently; nominal income
(Y) is the product of real income (y) and prices (P).
So equation (1) can be rewritten in the form
(2) M = k(yP),
where yP = Y. If changes in the nominal money stock
are not associated with permanent changes in real
income and the k-ratio is stable, increases in inflation
are linked directly to increases in money growth.
This age-old proposition recognizes the fact that
increased money growth by itself cannot lead to an
increase in the production of real goods. This fact
can be illustrated by an example in which the money
stock doubles, making Jane’s checking account
today twice as big as it was yesterday. What does
Jane do? Of course, she might spend all the money,
save it all, or spend and save it in varying propor-
tions. The impact of these events on the overall
economy is that demands for different goods are
likely to change. For goods for which demand has
increased, more of those goods are needed, so pro-
duction increases. Real output (income) rises as
more goods are produced. However, there is an
upper limit to this production surge, a limit placed
by existing plants, equipment, production technolo-
gies, and the current labor force. As demands for
goods rise and the ability to produce more is con-
strained, profit-maximizing firms raise prices to
ration the scarce goods. Over time, increasing the
growth rate of the money supply is likely to be evi-
denced in rising inflation rates and not in increased
rates at which goods and services are produced.
This is the story that monetarists reinvigorated in
the 1960s, which reappeared as the New Keynesian
story of the 1980s and 1990s.3
This story provides a substantial foundation for
understanding what monetarism is. Of course, exactly
what constitutes monetarism varies as much as the
number of individuals attempting to define it.4 For
the purposes of this article, the definition of mone-
tarism comprises three facets. First, it refers to a set
of testable propositions from which policy prescrip-
tions are determined. For example, Milton Friedman’s
famous X percent rule for monetary policy is an15 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
example of a policy prescription derived from empir-
ical findings.5 Second, movements in the money sup-
ply are considered to be a major factor explaining
observed changes in income, prices, and, in the short
run, real output. This view suggests that money and
nominal income should be positively related, just as
money growth and inflation should be. While mone-
tary impulses may have an impact on real economic
activity in the short run, money and real output are
not likely to be related over time. Finally, the mone-
tary authority is believed to be accountable, over time,
for movements in the money stock. Even though
most central banks use short-term interest rates
as the policy tool, manipulating interest rates still
requires changes in the reserve structure of the bank-
ing system, and these changes produce changes in the
money stock.
This article uses these propositions to address
the question raised in the article’s title. The discus-
sion focuses on the first two points, leaving the issue
of money stock control for another study. Before
turning to the empirical evidence on these points,
however, it is useful to examine a brief history of
monetarism’s rise and fall as a policy guide.
A Brief History of Monetarism
M
oney’s role in the macroeconomic theories
developed during the 1930–60 period was
negligible.6 Following the Great Depression
and World War II, the dominant view was that gov-
ernments could successfully manage economies to
achieve full employment. The tool by which such
“demand management” could be conducted was fiscal
policy. Monetary policy was considered important only
in the sense that it would keep interest rates at levels
necessary to maintain economic growth. Inflation was
of little concern in the early postwar period.7
Against this mainstream view, some economists
emphasized the empirical relationship between
movements in the money stock, nominal income,
and inflation. The early studies of Warburton (1966)
stand out in this regard. Warburton tested the link
between money and inflation and money and
income, providing empirical support for the notion
that increases in the growth rate of the money stock
lead to similar increase in the inflation rate. He also
found that short-run fluctuations in real output are
related to similar changes in money growth. Both of
these empirical results became a hallmark of modern
monetarism. Unfortunately, Warburton’s evidence
and scholarly work received scant attention and did
little to alter mainstream perceptions regarding the
importance of money.
Although the history of monetarism in the post-
war period contains many important and interesting
contributions, this article focuses on three: the early
work done by Milton Friedman and his associates,
the Andersen-Jordan model of income determination
and the subsequent St. Louis model, and the velocity
shift of the early 1980s.
Friedman and Associates. The 1950s witnessed
an increase in scholarly work on monetary theory
and policy. Notable in this regard is the work of
Milton Friedman and his students at the University
of Chicago. Friedman’s research agenda at the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in
the early 1950s began to focus on monetary eco-
nomics.8 For example, an early analysis examined
the effects of money on the economy during
wartime (Friedman 1952). The mid-1950s saw the
publication of Studies in the Quantity Theory of
Money (1956), a collection of articles by Friedman
and his students in the monetary workshop at the
University of Chicago. His introductory essay, “The
1. See Mayer (1999), DeLong (1997), or Sargent (1999) for a discussion of what is referred to as the “Great Inflation.”
2. See Hafer (1999) and Meigs (1976) for a discussion of the early debates over the use of monetary targets. A review of policy
actions taken by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reveals that, during the period from 1950 through 1979 and
since 1982, monetary aggregates have been ignored more often than they have contributed to policy decisions.
3. See Mayer and Minford (1995), DeLong (2000), or Woodford (forthcoming).
4. Mayer (1978), for example, suggests more than a dozen attributes of what makes up monetarism, including notions about
governmental intervention.
5. The so-called Taylor rule, which relates changes in the federal funds rate to deviations in inflation and output from their
desired rates, is a recent policy rule derived from empirical findings. Its long-term viability, like Friedman’s rule, will be sub-
ject to the vagaries of the underlying data. 
6. Portions of this discussion draw on Hafer and Wheelock (2001). Note that the discussion deals only with monetarism as it
developed in the United States, not elsewhere.
7. The notion that monetary policy actions, defined as changes in the growth rate of the money stock, are unrelated to economic
activity and should not be given much due is not an idea that remained the exclusive property of economists in the 1940s or
1950s. More recent evidence of such a view is found in B. Friedman (1984, 1997).
8. As Friedman recalls it, “In 1950, Arthur Burns, who had taken over from [Wesley Claire] Mitchell as director of research, asked
me whether I would take responsibility for the part of the study dealing with the role of money in business cycles. Both his
invitation and my acceptance of it demonstrates the interest that I had already developed in the role of money” (Friedman
and Friedman 1998, 227–28). 16 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement,” is con-
sidered by some as the defining article that estab-
lished modern monetarism.
Friedman posits in this essay that nominal income
is closely related to monetary developments: simply
put, the theory of money demand is really just a
theory of nominal income determination. Mayer and
Minford (1995) suggest that Friedman’s essay shifted
the debate from money’s long-run effects on prices
to its shorter-term influence on the business cycle.
As they state, “This meant that the quantity theory
could now explain changes in output as well as in
prices, and could no longer be dismissed as arbitrar-
ily assuming full employment” (4). This view con-
trasted sharply with
the Keynesian ortho-
doxy, one in which
money had little or no
role.9 Friedman’s own
view is that the publi-
cation of this book in
1956 was “the first
major step in a coun-
terrevolution in mon-





the unlovely label of
‘monetarism’” (Fried-
man and Friedman 1998, 228).10
Friedman’s work during the 1950s laid the foun-
dation for later studies linking the behavior of the
economy to monetary policy actions. His early work
at the NBER with Anna J. Schwartz began to focus
more on the business cycle effects of money and
monetary policy.11 His testimony to the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee in 1958 provides a glimpse into
this early counter-attack on Keynesian orthodoxy.
At that time policymakers within the Federal
Reserve System typically expressed little concern
over money’s cyclical effects. Minutes of the FOMC’s
policy meetings indicate that committee members
largely rejected the notion that movements in the
money supply could be controlled, much less that
changes in money growth affected economic activity
in any predictable manner. A few members of the
FOMC warned that significant shifts in money growth
could cause undesirable shifts in the real economy
and that the secular increase in money growth would
likely raise inflation rates. Unfortunately, these con-
cerns went largely unheeded.12
A critical event in the early monetarist assault on
Keynesian policies occurred with the 1963 publica-
tion of Friedman and Meiselman’s “The Relative
Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment
Multiplier in the United States, 1897–1958.” The key
empirical finding reported in the article rejected a
core component in the Keynesian macro model—
namely, the relative stability of the expenditure
multiplier. Instead, Friedman and Meiselman demon-
strated that the velocity of money, considered by
Keynesians to be highly erratic and thus obviating
any reliable money-income link, is relatively stable
over time.13 They argued that changes in the money
stock are more likely caused by changes in the money
supply—stemming directly from monetary policy
actions—than from changes in the public’s demand
for money. This finding supported an underlying
tenet of the quantity theory and the emerging mone-
tarist argument: changes in nominal income are
largely determined by changes in the money supply.
Since movements in the money supply are related
directly to policy actions, fluctuations in economic
activity logically are tied to the Fed’s policy actions.
Friedman and Meiselman’s evidence and method-
ology were attacked and dismissed by mainstream
economists. The criticisms of Ando and Modigliani
(1965) and DePrano and Mayer (1965) were pub-
lished in the American Economic Review along
with the Friedman-Meiselman article and the latter’s
rebuttal (1965). The debate reflected a fundamental
difference in views on the importance of money and
the role of monetary policy. Friedman and
Meiselman’s evidence came from simple, reduced-
form relations reminiscent of the quantity theory.
Their conclusions were based on observed long-run
relations in the data. Keynesian policies and view-
points, represented by the Ando-Modigliani and
DePrano-Mayer papers, relied on the output of newly
developed, large-scale macroeconometric models.
These models focused more on short-run dynamics,
not long-run implications. Ando-Modigliani argued,
for example, that the Friedman-Meiselman analysis
used methods that were “inadequate” given the
advances in econometrics and evidenced in the con-
struction of large-scale models. In later analysis,
Blinder and Solow (1974) suggested that the
reduced-form approach taken by Friedman-
Meiselman was “far too primitive to represent any
theory” (cited in McCallum 1986, 11). The conven-
tional view was that while different approaches gen-
erate different results, only the more sophisticated
approach produces a reliable outcome.14
Finding that velocity appeared more stable than
commonly thought heightened the debate over the
relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal actions
as countercyclical policies. Most economists contin-
ued to support the use of fiscal actions as the only
In October 1982 the Fed
abandoned monetary tar-
gets as operating guides
and returned to targeting
the federal funds rate.
Indeed, today monetary
growth targets play no
official role in the setting
of U.S. monetary policy.17 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
effective policy tools available to manage real eco-
nomic activity.15
The results of Friedman and Meiselman helped
spur the development of a nascent monetarist
research agenda. The publication in 1963 of
Friedman and Schwartz’s massive A Monetary
History of the United States: 1867–1960 provided
even greater ammunition to the monetarist move-
ment. In their study, Friedman and Schwartz docu-
mented the long-term, empirical relation between
movements in the money supply, income, and
prices. A major point established in their meticulous
analysis of empirical relations and institutional
detail was that movements in the money supply
largely dictate observed changes in the economy.
Indeed, a major contribution of the study was its
description of policy blunders that led to the Great
Depression. In the end, much of the blame was laid
at the Fed’s doorstep. While Friedman and
Schwartz’s Monetary History helped to establish a
foundation for monetary policy emphasizing control
of the monetary aggregates, the nature of the analy-
sis was decidedly long-run.
Andersen-Jordan and the St. Louis Model.
The heretofore long-run nature of the monetarist
position changed dramatically with the 1968 publi-
cation of Andersen and Jordan’s “Monetary and
Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance.”
Their controversial results were based on testing
the empirical relation between changes in nominal
income and various measures of money and fiscal
policy actions. The key equation can be written as






λj Et–j + et,
where Y represents nominal GNP, M is the money
stock (M1 or the monetary base), and E is one of
several measures of fiscal policy actions.16 The form
of the equation explicitly recognizes the lagged
effects of policy actions and allows a more precise
estimation of the effects of changes in the policy
variables. Andersen and Jordan, like Friedman and
Meiselman, were interested in the role that money
plays in explaining movements in nominal income.17
But Andersen and Jordan extended the attack on
the conventional wisdom by directly comparing the
quantitative importance of the effect that monetary
and fiscal impulses have on nominal income.
Money’s role in explaining movements in nomi-
nal income was an important policy issue in 1968.
Jordan recalls that “the 1966 credit crunch and
subsequent ‘mini recession’ had demonstrated the
potential for a restrictive monetary policy, mea-
sured in terms of a deceleration of monetary growth,
to dominate an expansive fiscal impulse” (1986,
5).18 The Andersen-Jordan results provided sup-
port for a key element in the monetarist position:
namely, money is not only important in affecting
nominal income but has a more direct and man-
ageable impact on the economy than fiscal policy
actions. In a significant way, the Andersen-Jordan
results pushed the long-run monetarist proposi-
tions further into the short end of the policy hori-
zon. Andersen and Jordan demonstrated that, by
manipulating monetary aggregates, policymakers
could achieve the kind of demand-management
outcomes once thought possible only through fiscal
policy actions.
Andersen and Jordan’s results came under
immediate criticism. A number of the criticisms
9. This view is debatable, as the exchange in Hafer (1986) between McCallum, Brunner, Blinder, and Gordon indicates.
10. Although Friedman is often considered the “father” of monetarism, it was Karl Brunner (1968) who coined the term. 
11. This research would later be published in three volumes. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1970, 1982).
12. Some members of the FOMC favored policies that placed more weight on the behavior of the money supply over financial
market conditions. Of this small group, Delos Johns, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and Malcolm Bryan,
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, stand out. They based their policy recommendations on recent monetarist
analyses. For a discussion of their contributions to the policy debate, see Meigs (1976) and Hafer (1999).
13. The velocity of money is simply the inverse of the k-ratio.
14. McCallum notes that “Most researchers in macroeconomics believed . . . that investigation of the issues under discussion could
be adequately carried out in the context of a full specified, simultaneous-equation, econometric model”(1986, 11). Brunner
rejected this notion, stating that “the use of a single equation with a single independent variable should now be clear. It was
the appropriate choice for an assessment of the core class [of hypotheses]. It did not represent a single-equation model or a
disposition to favor simple, as against sophistical, models” (1986, 41).
15. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the debate, see the articles in Hafer (1986).
16. Their analysis used three fiscal policy measures: the high-employment budget surplus, high-employment expenditures, and
high-employment receipts.
17. Andersen-Jordan’s intellectual link to earlier work by Karl Brunner is obvious. For example, Brunner and Balbach (1959)
tested the relative role of money and fiscal policy actions and found that money played an important role.
18. The importance of the events surrounding the 1968 decline is revealed in Maisel’s appraisal: “Monetarists’ forecasts have
had a fair record. The fact that they did well in 1968 when most others did poorly was a major cause of their initial popu-
larity. . . . But I, at least, do not believe their record has been good enough to prove their simplified theory” (1973, 274).18 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
were technical in nature.19 It is interesting to note
that some of the earliest and harshest criticisms
came from within the Federal Reserve System
itself. For example, DeLeeuw and Kalchbrenner
(1969), both associated with the Board of
Governors, argued that the monetary aggregate
favored by Andersen and Jordan (the monetary
base) was not exogenous with respect to move-
ments in nominal income.20 They also argued that
Andersen and Jordan’s results were inconsistent
(and therefore suspect) with those generated by
the Board of Governor’s large-scale econometric
model. Davis, an economist at the New York Fed,
took up this argument, noting that the St. Louis
equation “portrays a
world [that is] in sev-
eral respects sharply
at variance with the
expectations of most
of us” (1968, 121). He
suggested that mone-
tarists build a struc-









argues that the next significant development in the
monetarist counter-revolution came with the 1970
publication of Andersen and Carlson’s “A Monetarist
Model for Economic Stabilization.” Usually referred
to as the St. Louis model, this study and subsequent
refinement of the model put monetarism on similar
footing with Keynesian models. The St. Louis model
was “monetarist” in the sense that, even though
money appears only in the total spending equation,
its effects percolate throughout. For example, the
effects from an increase in the growth rate of the
money supply could be traced through its impact on
nominal spending, changes in the price level, real
output, long-term interest rates, and unemploy-
ment.22 Since price level changes came about
through a simple Phillips-curve relation embedded
in the model, no claim was made that that relation-
ship was being ignored. In fact, Andersen and
Carlson explicitly state that their analysis was used
“to estimate the response of output and prices to
monetary and fiscal actions, not to test a hypothe-
sized structure” (1970, 10–11).
The St. Louis model strengthened monetarism’s
place in policy discussions in several ways. First,
monetarist analysis moved into the realm of short-
run policy dynamics. Second, the estimated rela-
tionships provided support for the theoretical
findings of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) that
there does not exist a long-run, exploitable trade-
off between inflation and unemployment, as many
Keynesian economists believed. Estimates of the
St. Louis model also demonstrated that expansionary
monetary policy can produce a short-run increase in
real economic growth (a reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate) but that it will vanish over time as inflation
picks up and the economy returns to its potential rate
of growth. Such actions, taken repeatedly, impart an
inflationary bias to the economy.23
Third, the Andersen-Carlson results showed that
monetary policy, not fiscal policy, is a more potent
tool for economic stabilization. Now monetary pol-
icy was defined in concrete terms. Instead of terms
like “money market pressure” or “tone and feel,” a
vocabulary that popularized monetary policy analy-
sis in the 1950s and 1960s (and has resurfaced in
recent times), changes in the growth of the mone-
tary aggregates could be calculated and their effects
analyzed. The St. Louis model helped push the mon-
etarist agenda to the forefront of the short-run sta-
bilization debate more forcefully than previous work
had. Dewald argues that “monetarism was [now]
widely interpreted as providing an alternative to
short run Keynesian model forecasts” (1988, 6).
The Rise and Fall of Monetarism as a Policy
Guide. As the success of monetarist predictions
mounted, monetarists began to shift from testing
rival policies to arguing for the use of monetary
aggregates as a short-run stabilization tool. Ongoing
development of the St. Louis model and its variants,
along with its use for policy analysis, pushed mone-
tarism away from its roots in the long-term relations
embodied in the quantity theory. By the mid-1970s,
monetarism had elbowed its way squarely into the
arena of short-run stabilization issues.24 Unlike the
large-scale macroeconometric models that con-
tained hundreds of variables and equations, the
archetypal monetarist model allowed one to analyze
stabilization issues using a handful of equations.25
The increase in inflation rates throughout the
1970s led many to reconsider monetarist calls for a
policy of steady money growth. Even though the
inflation spikes of the 1970s were related directly to
oil price shocks, the rising trend rate of inflation
since the mid-1960s shadowed a similar increase in
the average rate of money growth.26 The Fed began,
reluctantly, to adopt parts of the monetarist plat-
form. In the mid-1970s, monetary targets were
being used in official policy analysis; there is sub-
stantial evidence, however, that these targets were
The Andersen-Jordan results
provided support for a key
element in the monetarist
position: namely, money is
not only important in affect-
ing nominal income but has
a more direct and manage-
able impact on the economy
than fiscal policy actions.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
more window-dressing than strict policy guidelines
(Friedman 1982).
The most dramatic shift toward a monetarist-like
policy occurred in October 1979. At that time the
Fed announced that it would henceforth emphasize
policy procedures aimed more at controlling nonbor-
rowed reserves than at the federal funds rate.27 This
shift was made to reduce inflation rates, which were
then running in double digits. The restrictive policies
enacted served to help lower inflation (and inflation-
ary expectations), but they also sent the economy
into the deepest postwar recession on record.
Monetarist theory predicted the outcome: A
swift, sharp reduction in money growth (and the
attendant spike in interest rates) initially affected
real economic activity and then, over time, lowered
inflation. Although monetarists predicted the out-
come, they neither favored the policy nor claimed
credit for it.28 While monetarists attempted to dis-
associate themselves from the Fed’s policies and to
provide alternative procedures to achieve the
desired money growth,29 public perception and pro-
fessional opinion quickly rejected the so-called
monetarist policies being followed by the Fed.
Attacks on monetarism surged not only in academic
journals but in the popular press as well.30
Whether the Fed truly embraced a monetarist pol-
icy agenda in 1979 remains debatable, but the Fed’s
policies dealt a severe blow to monetarism. In addi-
tion, sweeping deregulation associated with the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 gave rise to increased volatility in
the empirical links between the existing monetary
aggregates and the economy. The spread of interest-
bearing checking accounts severely altered the rela-
tionship between narrow measures of money and
income from their historical norms. The most visible
effect was the unexpected and large shift in velocity in
the early 1980s, which severely reduced the accuracy
of monetarist model predictions of nominal income
growth and inflation.31 As the 1980s progressed,
deregulation of the banking system, largely a response
to the disintermediation that occurred in response to
the inflation of the 1970s, and the quickened pace of
financial innovations altered the historical empirical
relationships between money, income, and prices.
19. For reference to previous studies, see Hafer and Wheelock (2001).
20. Deleeuw and Kalchbrenner (1969) decomposed the monetary base into what they argued were the most exogenous com-
ponents: reserves less bank borrowings—the adjusted base—and the adjusted base less currency. With this change they
found that when the adjusted base was paired with real high-employment receipts, the sum of the estimated coefficients on
lagged money—a measure of the monetary multiplier—was less than that found by Andersen and Jordan. Even so, the
results were striking enough to show that monetary policy appeared “to exert a powerful influence.” 
21. Brunner (1986) notes in his survey that this criticism confused competing economic theory with testing a core class of
hypotheses that are derived from theory. Even so, the stigma attached to reduced-form results dogged the debate. Regardless
of the amount of empirical support for the finding that money influenced nominal income, monetary policy continues to this
day to focus on the behavior of interest rates as the mechanism by which policy actions are transmitted to the economy.
22. Output is determined as the difference between total spending and the price level. As Andersen and Carlson note, “This
method of determining the change in total spending and its division between output change and price change differs from
most econometric models. A standard practice in econometric model building is to determine output and prices separately,
then combine them to determine total spending” (1970, 10).
23. For a discussion about the role of monetary policy in generating the spiraling inflation that began in the 1960s, see the inter-
views in Mayer (1999).
24. Hafer and Wheelock (2001) detail the difficulties that this focus placed on the popularity of monetarism in policy discussions.
Tavlas (personal correspondence) suggests that the movement to a shorter-term focus occurred much earlier, evidenced by
the publication of Friedman (1972).
25. The 1970 version of the St. Louis model, for example, contained eight equations and eleven economic variables.
26. Fed Governor Gramley is quoted in Grieder (1987) as saying, “When you look back over the past fifteen years, you find that
inflation kept getting worse. It got worse for a whole variety of reasons, but certainly one of them was that the course of
monetary policy over this long period had permitted a rapid increase in money and credit” (emphasis added) (1987,
94). For discussions of the “Great Inflation,” see DeLong (1997), Mayer (1999), and Sargent (1999). 
27. For a timely overview of the so-called monetarist experiment, see Brunner (1983). 
28. See the debate between M. Friedman (1984) and B. Friedman (1984).
29. For example, a number of studies demonstrated that the money multiplier was easily forecast, thus allowing the Fed to
achieve monetary growth targets. See, among others, Johannes and Rasche (1979) and Hafer and Hein (1984) for examples
of such analyses. Of course, the vacuous argument made against such evidence was that, once the Fed began to target the
money stock, the ability to forecast the multiplier would be impaired.
30. Batten and Stone (1983) provide a partial listing of the articles taking a negative view of the monetarist experiment. (The
author’s personal favorite is Kaldor 1982.)
31. A key ingredient of the earlier success of short-run, empirical monetarist models had been the relative stability of velocity over
much of the postwar period, even though this point was recognized early in the debate. See, among others, Rasche (1972). 20 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
In light of these events, policymakers quickly
rejected monetary aggregates as a policy tool. In lieu
of money, they once again returned to the manipu-
lation of the federal funds rate to achieve policy
objectives. Since the early 1980s, monetary aggre-
gates have played a minimal role in the conduct of
U.S. monetary policy. In the early 1990s, Taylor
(1993) showed that U.S. monetary policy could be
described accurately by relating movements in the
federal funds rate to deviations in inflation from a
posited target rate and deviations in real output
growth from potential growth. The so-called Taylor
rule has dominated much of the research on mone-
tary policy during the past decade, both as a model
of Fed behavior and
as a model to guide
policy decisions.32
What is notable in this
monetary policy rule
is that money does
not appear.
The failure of mon-
etarism to survive as a
policy guide has been
noted by Fed Gover-
nor Meyer (2001),
who stated, “Monetar-
ism is about money,
but money plays no
explicit role in today’s
consensus macro
model, and it plays virtually no role in the conduct of
monetary policy, at least in the United States.” 33 The
consensus macro model to which Meyer refers is
described in McCallum (1999) and Rudebusch and
Svensson (2000), among others. In this model,
money’s purpose is only to assist the central bank in
determining the interest rate. The consensus macro
model determines the inflation rate, the level of out-
put, and the interest rate without any direct reference
to the behavior of the money stock. As McCallum
notes, “This is the basic point that has led many
researchers to ignore money and, indeed, that has led
the staff of the Fed’s Board of Governors to construct
a large, sophisticated, and expensive new macro-
econometric model that does not recognize money in
any capacity” (1999, 7). Meltzer echoes this in his
observation that “Most working economists, most
central bank staffs, and market practitioners do not
use money growth to predict inflation” (1999, 25).
It would be incorrect, however, to conclude that
monetarism failed. In fact, several of its key tenets
have become characteristics of current economic
thinking. DeLong (2000) and Woodford (forthcom-
ing), for example, argue that the general acceptance
of policy rules is a direct descendant of the mone-
tarist agenda. In addition, the very fact that monetary
policy, not fiscal policy, is considered the major
weapon to combat economic fluctuation is a clear vic-
tory for the monetarist view. Still, interest rate manip-
ulation once again dominates controlling growth in
the monetary aggregates as a means of achieving
stable economic growth and low inflation. The policy
role of money is back to where it was almost forty
years ago, and policy discussion today is similar to
that found in the FOMC minutes from the 1960s.34
Monetarism is based on an empirical relation
between movements in the money supply and
income and prices. Thus, is there any informational
content in the monetary aggregates that could help
determine the direction and thrust of policy
actions? Answering this question occupies the
remainder of this article.
Empirical Evidence
T
his section provides some empirical evidence
aimed at answering the question raised in the
article’s title as well as Meyer’s (2001) corol-
lary question: Does money matter? The analysis
approaches this task in three interrelated parts.
First, data from a sample of diverse countries is
examined to determine whether money growth and
nominal income growth are positively and signifi-
cantly related. Next, the link between money and
inflation is investigated. Finally, the effect of money
on short-term fluctuations in real output is tested.
Overall, the evidence indicates that movements in
the money supply still help explain movements in
nominal income, prices, and real output.
Data. The analysis uses annual post–World War II
data from a diverse sample of countries. The data
include two measures of money (M1 and M2), the
price level (measured using the consumer price
index [CPI]), nominal income (gross domestic prod-
uct [GDP]), and real income (real GDP). The choice
of countries is based on no specific criteria beyond
data availability, attempting to provide a wide range
in economic experience, and keeping the discussion
tractable. The attempt is not to achieve total cover-
age but to test the general applicability of several
key monetarist propositions. The sample of coun-
tries, the period covered, and summary statistics are
provided in Table 1.35
Fifteen countries, including developed and devel-
oping countries, make up the sample. This sample
covers a wide variety of economic experiences. For
example, the average annual inflation rate averages
a little over 9 percent, ranging from Malta’s 3.3 per-
cent to Indonesia’s 23.3 percent. Similarly, average
annual nominal GDP growth spreads across a wide
Unlike the large-scale
macroeconometric models
that contained hundreds of
variables and equations, the
archetypal monetarist model
allowed one to analyze sta-
bilization issues using a
handful of equations.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
range, from 7.3 percent in the United States to 31.5
percent in Indonesia. One aspect worth noting is
that average nominal GDP growth across the sample
is closer to money growth than is inflation or real
GDP growth. As Table 1 shows, the average growth
rate of the money supply—14.5 percent for M1 and
16.2 percent for M2—is closer to nominal GDP
growth (14.5 percent) than to average inflation (9.3
percent). It should also be noted that average real
GDP growth (5.1 percent) is noticeably less than
money growth. Finally, the range of growth rates for
real GDP—2.9 percent to 9.4 percent—is less than
the range recorded for nominal GDP growth and
inflation.36 As a first approximation, these data sug-
gest a closer relation between money and nominal
income than between money and inflation or money
and real output.
Correlations. If money matters for policy, there
should be a correlation between money growth,
nominal income growth, and inflation. In addition, if
money growth has little impact on real output in the
long run, then a smaller correlation between money
growth and real output growth should be found in
the data. It is useful to compare correlations across
three time horizons, using annual observations of
each variable, to assess the link between money and
32. For a critical analysis of the Taylor rule and its applicability, see Hetzel (2000) and the works cited therein. Arguably, the
Taylor rule suffers from the same problems as the monetarist rule—namely, reliance on short-term empirical relationships
in the data to drive policy implications. As Hetzel demonstrates, policies derived from the rule change over time, thus yield-
ing questionable guidance. 
33. There is an inconsistency to recent discussions concerning the role of money in monetary policy and the ultimate policy
objective of price stability. For instance, Meyer (2001) states that money “plays virtually no explicit role in the conduct of
monetary policy” in the United States and that “money matters—indeed it is just about all that matters—for inflation in the
long run.” While price stability is widely acknowledged as the appropriate long-run objective of monetary policy, many econ-
omists argue that policymakers should respond to fluctuations in real output or employment as part of their strategy to
achieve price stability and, ultimately, to support maximum sustainable economic growth. This position is taken in Mishkin
(2000), for example.
34. Consider Estrella and Mishkin’s argument that “the inability of monetary aggregates to perform well as straightforward infor-
mation variables in recent periods has the implication that they cannot be used to signal the stance of monetary policy, an
important requirement if money growth targets are to be used as part of a strategy to increase the transparency of mone-
tary policy to the public and the markets” (1996, 29).
35. All data are from the December 2000 International Financial Statistics CD.
36. This correlation between money growth, income growth, and inflation using a cross-section of countries has been docu-
mented previously. For recent examples, see Dwyer and Hafer (1988, 1999) and the references cited therein. 
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Average Rates of Growth (Percent)
Country Sample M1 M2 Price Level Nominal GDP Real GDP
Canada 1950–99 7.9 8.7 3.5 8.0 3.8
Chile 1960–99 23.7 26.4 16.5 21.7 5.2
Colombia 1955–99 20.0 22.9 16.6 21.2 4.6
Denmark 1950–99 8.3 8.2 5.3 8.2 3.0
Egypt 1952–99 10.8 13.5 7.6 12.4 4.9
Iceland 1951–98 20.5 21.4 16.1 21.4 5.3
Indonesia 1965–99 31.4 36.4 23.3 31.5 8.2
Japan 1953–99 10.5 11.0 4.0 9.2 5.3
Korea 1966–99 19.0 23.2 9.2 18.7 9.4
Malta 1957–99 7.8 9.6 3.3 8.7 5.4
Pakistan 1956–99 11.8 12.8 7.4 12.3 5.0
Philippines 1950–99 11.9 14.6 8.1 12.4 4.3
South Africa 1965–99 15.2 13.4 9.8 13.7 3.8
Thailand 1953–99 10.5 14.5 4.7 10.7 5.9
United States 1959–99 5.6 6.9 4.4 7.3 2.9
Averages 14.5 16.2 9.3 14.5 5.1
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics CD, December 2000.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
the economy. The analysis uses rolling averages of
growth rates over one- three- and five-year inter-
vals. This approach, similar to that of Dewald (1998)
and Dwyer (1998), smoothes short-run fluctuations
in the series that may mask the underlying, long-
term relationship.37 The correlations are reported
in Table 2.
The results based on annual observations indicate
a wide range of correlation for the money-price link.
The correlation between M1 growth and inflation for
the United States is 0.21. Using M2, the annual corre-
lation is zero. This finding seems to support the con-
tention that there is little informational content in the
money growth numbers that policymakers can
exploit. Looking across
countries, the range of
the annual correlation
is from –0.04 for the






M1 growth and infla-
tion is about 0.25 per-
cent. Using M2 growth,
the average correla-
tion increases slightly
to 0.40 percent. In
either case, these cor-
relations suggest a fairly loose relationship at an
annual horizon. Indeed, this evidence suggests that
the money-inflation link is rather weak over a period
as short as one year.
When the growth rates are averaged over time, the
correlation between money and inflation generally
increases. In Thailand, for example, the M1-inflation
correlation is essentially zero with annual data but
increases to 0.27 using the three-year average data
and to 0.42 for the five-year averaged data. If M2 is
used, the five-year correlation jumps to 0.63. This
increase is also found in most other countries for
which the annual correlations are rather low. For
instance, the M2-inflation correlation using annual
data for the United States is 0.21 but is 0.56 using the
five-year interval. In one instance—Canada—there is
no noticeable increase in the correlation between M1
growth and inflation even as longer averages are used.
However, the money-inflation correlation in Canada is
noticeably larger using the broader M2 measure: the
correlation increases from 0.57 percent with annual
data to 0.74 percent using five-year averages.
The results in Table 2 indicate that the link
between money and inflation improves as the time
horizon increases. The cross-country average corre-
lation between M1 growth and inflation is 0.25 at an
annual frequency but 0.60 percent when five-year
averages are used. Similarly, the correlation
between M2 growth and inflation jumps from a sam-
ple average of 0.40 using annual data to 0.70 with
five-year averages. These results are consistent with
the proposition that money growth and inflation are
related more closely in the long run.
Table 2 reveals, in all instances but one, a positive
correlation between annual money growth and nom-
inal GDP growth, and in most cases this correlation
increases as the time interval expands. For example,
for the United States the correlation between annual
M2 and GDP growth rates is 0.49, increasing to 0.85
when the data are averaged over five years. A similar
increase in correlation is reported for most other
countries although the magnitude of the increase
varies. As with inflation, comparing the averages
across countries is useful. For instance, the sample
average money-GDP correlation using annual data is
0.40 percent using M1 and 0.57 percent using M2.
When five-year averages are used, the correlation
increases to 0.65 and 0.83, respectively. This evidence
indicates not only that there is a positive correlation
between money growth and nominal income growth
but that this correlation increases as the time inter-
val increases. This outcome also is consistent with the
proposition that income growth and money growth
are positively related.
Finally, monetarists often claim that the correlation
between money growth and real income growth weak-
ens over time relative to money-inflation and money-
nominal income. The results in Table 2 bear this out.
The correlation between money growth and real GDP
growth using the five-year averages is considerably
smaller than the corresponding correlations between
money growth, inflation, and nominal income growth.
Even though there are instances in which the correla-
tion appears relatively large (for example, Malta [0.84]
and Japan [0.82]), on average the money-real income
correlations are smaller. This general view again is sup-
ported by measuring the average correlations across
countries. The average M1–real income correlation is
0.26 percent at an annual horizon and only 0.19 using
the five-year averages. If M2 is used, the correlations
are 0.27 and 0.17, respectively. This evidence suggests
37. Dwyer (1998, n. 3) notes that a drawback of using rolling averages is that it induces serial correlation. Because each obser-
vation uses overlapping data, the usual tests for zero correlation are invalid. Even so, such averaging does not preclude com-
paring correlations as the time interval changes.
Policies that increase
money growth are more
likely, over time, to generate
increased inflation, not
faster growth in the produc-




Time Interval Time Interval
Country Paira 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year
Canada M, P .00 .05 .16 .57 .71 .74
M, GDP –.09 .14 .17 .61 .81 .81
M, RGDP –.10 .14 .03 .17 .24 .15
Chile M, P .66 .69 .75 .60 .86 .87
M, GDP .78 .77 .75 .51 .62 .72
M, RGDP .72 .57 .37 .14 –.12 –.21
Colombia M, P .40 .77 .87 .57 .84 .90
M, GDP .50 .53 .46 .70 .90 .93
M, RGDP .12 .06 –.12 .18 .06 –.10
Denmark M, P .21 .55 .62 .33 .50 .49
M.GDP .26 .41 .41 .38 .72 .74
M, RGDP .07 .11 .13 .08 .05 .07
Egypt M, P .44 .32 .28 .62 .71 .77
M, GDP .62 .76 .81 .76 .87 .92
M, RGDP .33 .50 .49 .29 .38 .33
Iceland M, P .78 .92 .95 .82 .93 .96
M, GDP .81 .93 .94 .82 .92 .94
M, RGDP –.02 –.06 –.17 –.08 –.12 –.20
Indonesia M, P .35 .74 .94 .57 .72 .95
M, GDP .56 .86 .97 .70 .79 .96
M, RGDP .38 .43 .58 .27 .30 .50
Japan M, P .30 .46 .52 .41 .49 .55
M, GDP .59 .77 .84 .78 .91 .96
M, RGDP .50 .62 .68 .65 .79 .82
Korea M, P .19 .58 .74 .44 .78 .77
M, GDP .55 .86 .92 .53 .82 .82
M, RGDP .50 .71 .75 .21 .35 .51
Malta M, P .37 .64 .70 .06 .36 .52
M, GDP .56 .79 .82 .59 .83 .89
M, RGDP .39 .54 .59 .70 .81 .84
Pakistan M, P .02 .31 .61 .04 .34 .61
M, GDP .16 .32 .64 .19 .40 .66
M, RGDP .25 .02 .06 .26 .11 .10
Philippines M, P –.04 .51 .70 .14 .47 .74
M, GDP .08 .59 .70 .30 .53 .66
M, RGDP .18 –.10 –.41 .17 –.11 –.58
South Africa M, P .04 .28 .45 .17 .33 .61
M, GDP .34 .40 .40 .57 .70 .73
M, RGDP .33 .13 –.27 .49 .42 –.13
Thailand M, P –.01 .27 .42 .40 .51 .63
M, GDP .17 .51 .63 .63 .77 .84
M, RGDP .21 .33 .34 .32 .39 .37
United States M, P .00 .14 .28 .21 .43 .56
M, GDP .10 .22 .25 .49 .77 .85
M, RGDP .11 .03 –.16 .21 .19 .13
a The variables are money growth (M); the inflation rate (P), measured using the CPI; nominal GDP growth (GDP); and real GDP growth
(RGDP). All variables are measured as logarithmic first differences.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
that, in the long run, changes in money growth are
more likely to affect changes in nominal income and
inflation than changes in real output.
Why should money be related more closely with
changes in prices and nominal GDP than changes in
real output? If real output growth is, over time, deter-
mined by real factors, such as population growth or
technology, then changes in money growth should be
reflected in prices and nominal income (see equation
[2]). The correlations do not reject the notion that, in
the long run, changes in the growth rates of money
have less effect on the path of real economic activity
than on nominal income growth and inflation.38 This
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over time, to generate
increased inflation,
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given the k-ratio. This hypothesized relationship is
used to examine an important monetarist proposi-
tion—namely, that there exists a positive connec-
tion between changes in the stock of money and the
level of nominal income. The correlations in Table 2
generally do not reject this notion. To further check
whether money growth can serve as an indicator of
nominal income growth, this analysis employs so-
called Granger causality tests. The idea is to deter-
mine whether there is information in money growth
that, once estimates have been conditioned on past
income growth, significantly improves the predic-
tion of income. Even though such test results should
be viewed with some caution, they are instructive.
Table 3 reports the outcome of these pairwise
causality tests between money growth (M1 and M2)
and nominal income growth.39
The first two columns of Table 3 report statistics
associated with testing the hypothesis that M1
growth does not cause GDP growth. A statistically
significant test statistic allows one to reject that
hypothesis. The hypothesis is rejected in ten
instances at a 10 percent level of significance (eleven
if one permits the 12 percent significance level found
for Pakistan). These results suggest that in two-
thirds of the countries examined there is evidence
that changes in money growth have a significant
impact on nominal income growth. The second col-
umn tests the companion hypothesis, whether GDP
growth does not cause M1 growth. The results of
that test indicate that this hypothesis is rejected in
five cases, again using a 10 percent level of signifi-
cance. The results suggest that GDP growth does not
cause money growth in nine out of fifteen instances.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3 report
the results using the broader M2 measure of money.
Overall, the results are comparable to those using
M1. The hypothesis that M2 growth does not cause
GDP growth is rejected in eight instances, and in
seven cases the hypothesis that GDP growth does
not cause M2 growth is rejected. These results sug-
gest that the choice of the monetary aggregate has
some effect on the test outcome. Overall, the results
in Table 3 indicate that there is a causal link from
money growth to nominal income in many countries.
An even more restrictive hypothesis can be tested:
Does money have a unidirectional effect on nominal
GDP? This hypothesis is important to establish the
usefulness of monetary aggregates in conducting
monetary policy. If changes in money do not stem
from changes in income, money could serve as a use-
ful measure of the thrust of policy actions.40 The
results for M1 found in Table 3 indicate that one would
answer this question in the affirmative for seven coun-
tries: Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Japan, Malta, the
Philippines, and Thailand. Unidirectional causation
from M2 to income cannot be rejected for Canada,
Colombia, Egypt, Korea, and the Philippines. Note
that changing the definition of money affects the out-
come for Malta, Korea, and Thailand. The array of
economic experiences captured by this subsample of
countries suggests that the money-income relation
does not hold only for certain types of economies.
Conversely, is evidence of unidirectional causation
running from GDP growth to money growth? Such a
finding is most damaging to the idea that monetary
aggregates are useful in setting policy because it sig-
nals that money growth is not exogenous to changes
in income growth. The hypothesis that GDP unidirec-
tionally causes M1 is not rejected in only two coun-
tries—Iceland and Pakistan. In the remaining
countries, there is evidence of bidirectional causation
(Chile, Denmark, and Korea) or no discernable rela-
tion (Indonesia, South Africa, and the United States).
Replacing M1 with M2 leads to the following out-
comes: the hypothesis that GDP growth unidirection-
ally causes M2 is not rejected for Iceland, Malta,
Pakistan, and South Africa at the 10 percent level.
Bidirectional causation is not ruled out for Denmark,
It appears that changes in
the real money stock may
significantly affect short-
term economic activity
even after the impact of
changes in the real rate of
interest is accounted for.25 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
Japan, and the United States. The remaining coun-
tries indicate no reliable statistical relation. The fact
that the GDP-to-money causation is relatively weak
across most countries suggests that money may pos-
sess potentially useful policy information.
Money and Inflation. The view often stated by
policymakers is that the objective of monetary pol-
icy is to keep inflation at bay. Some central banks
announce explicit inflation targets although Mishkin
(2000) points out that the Federal Reserve has been
reluctant to do so. As Meyer (2001) notes, “Given
the widespread commitment to price stability, mon-
etarists believe that central banks should therefore
give appropriate attention to money growth in the
conduct of monetary policy.” Is there evidence to
support this belief?
A number of recent studies find that movements
in the nominal money stock and the price level are
positively related. Two approaches are used in these
studies. Dewald (1998), for example, averages money
growth and inflation data over time, sometimes for
periods as long as a decade. The other approach,
used in Dwyer and Hafer (1988, 1999), for example,
averages data over shorter time spans but across a
large number of countries. The analysis in this article
examines the temporal relationship between money
and prices on a country-by-country basis to gauge the
generality of the connection and to illustrate the idio-
syncratic nature of the relationships.
To better illuminate the link between money and
prices, equation (2) can be solved for the price level
to yield
(4) P = k–1(M/y).
Equation (4) states that, given the k-ratio, changes
in the ratio of money to real output are reflected in
the price level. If the k-ratio is relatively stable over
time,41 the price level and money per unit of output
should move together over time.
38. In a similar vein, Barro (1996) finds that there is no significant relation between inflation and economic growth for a large
sample of countries. If inflation is, in the long run, determined by money growth, then Barro’s results imply that money
growth and real economic growth also are not related over time.
39. For each test, two regressions are estimated, one with nominal income growth as the dependent variable, another with
money growth as the dependent variable. To conserve on degrees of freedom, the explanatory variables in each regression
consist of two lags of money growth and nominal GDP growth. In essence, then, the causality tests conducted here simply
ask whether there is any information in the variables that, after the estimates are conditioned with lags of the dependent
variable, improve the explanatory power of the equation. 
40. A classic treatment of the instrument-indicator issue is Brunner (1969).
41. This point has been the subject of intense and long-lasting debate, whether the issue revolved around the k-ratio or the
demand for real money balances. Although there is evidence that the demand for money is somewhat volatile in the short
run, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the economic relationship is stable over time. See, for example, Hoffman




M1 Does Not GDP Does Not M2 Does Not GDP Does Not
Country Cause GDP Cause M1 Cause GDP Cause M2
Canada 2.45 (0.09) 0.33 (0.72) 3.21 (0.05) 1.22 (0.30)
Chile 3.41 (0.05) 5.68 (0.01) 0.51 (0.61) 1.88 (0.19)
Colombia 18.88 (0.00) 1.28 (0.29) 5.67 (0.01) 2.23 (0.12)
Denmark 4.43 (0.02) 7.07 (0.00) 2.94 (0.06) 6.32 (0.00)
Egypt 11.74 (0.00) 0.41 (0.67) 18.41 (0.00) 0.36 (0.70)
Iceland 0.78 (0.46) 9.24 (0.00) 1.49 (0.24) 9.92 (0.00)
Indonesia 0.88 (0.43) 0.32 (0.73) 0.41 (0.67) 0.52 (0.60)
Japan 5.06 (0.02) 1.76 (0.18) 7.78 (0.00) 2.89 (0.07)
Korea 5.05 (0.02) 3.73 (0.04) 3.66 (0.04) 1.79 (0.19)
Malta 4.16 (0.02) 1.58 (0.22) 1.36 (0.27) 8.54 (0.00)
Pakistan 2.26 (0.12) 3.06 (0.06) 1.23 (0.30) 5.18 (0.01)
Philippines 13.13 (0.00) 0.78 (0.46) 11.99 (0.00) 0.09 (0.91)
South Africa 0.40 (0.67) 0.61 (0.55) 2.02 (0.15) 2.57 (0.10)
Thailand 4.04 (0.02) 0.82 (0.45) 1.09 (0.35) 1.98 (0.15)
United States 0.68 (0.51) 1.16 (0.33) 8.18 (0.00) 3.18 (0.05)26 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
Real output (y) plays an important role in this
story. The range of average output growth for the
countries studied here is considerably less than the
range for inflation and nominal income growth (see
Table 1). This result suggests that real output growth
may be determined less by nominal factors, such as
money growth, and more by real factors, such as pop-
ulation growth, changes in technology, and changes
in the capital stock. If one takes output in the long
run as being determined exogenously to monetary
policy, then the only impact of changes in the growth
rate of money is on the price level. In other words,
equation (4) shows that if the k-ratio is stable and
real output is determined independently of money,
there is a one-to-one
connection between




and prices within the
context of equation (4),
the ratio of money to
real income is plotted
along with the price
level for each country.
The resulting graphs
are shown in the chart
on page 27. The scale
for each graph is loga-
rithmic—that is, the
slope of the money-output ratio and the price level
lines represent rates of change. Similar slopes thus
indicate that the growth rates of the underlying
series are positively related.
The chart shows that for every country there is a
positive, long-run relationship between the money and
price series. It is informative that the recent deviation
in the United States, which occurred during the early
1990s, is not unique. Such deviations occur, sometimes
even frequently, but the two series persistently move
together over time. Whether for a high-inflation coun-
try such as Indonesia or Chile or a low-inflation
country like Japan, the plots in the chart indicate that
increases in the growth of money, given output growth,
are associated with higher rates of inflation.
Correlations between the two series (not reported)
indicate that there is nearly a one-to-one relation
between money and prices.42 This evidence corrobo-
rates the results in Table 2, where the correlation
between money growth alone and inflation increases
over lengthening time intervals. The upshot is that an
increase in the growth rate of money relative to real
output is likely to impart upward pressure on the
price level. Failure by central bankers to heed this sig-
nal may create inflationary increases that, as occurred
in the past, necessitate restrictive measures.43
Money and Real Output. Current U.S. monetary
policy, according to Meltzer (1998, 1999), McCallum
(1999), and Meyer (2001), utilizes several economic
models in which money generally plays no direct role.
This view is based on a popular macroeconomic
model in which movements in real output are a func-
tion solely of changes in the real rate of interest. In
this model, monetary policy affects real economic
activity only indirectly through its impact on the real
rate of interest. Movements in the money supply,
therefore, are viewed as having no independent
effect on output.44
The policy implications of this so-called consensus
model have been criticized by a number of economists,
such as Meltzer (1999) and Nelson (2000). The pop-
ular view is that policy actions taken by a central bank
first produce changes in a number of financial returns.
The transmission mechanism—the route by which pol-
icy actions affect the real economy—thus works pri-
marily through an interest rate channel. A change in
policy—that is, a change in the target federal funds
rate—leads to a series of changes in other interest
rates that induce individuals to reallocate portfolios
of financial and real assets, thus producing a change
in economic activity. Taking such a narrow focus usu-
ally means that one considers only one real interest
rate as reflective of policy actions—thus, the focus
on the federal funds rate as the sole policy indicator.
This narrow view ignores the potential effects
that arise through other avenues, such as changes in
real long-term rates or in the return on real assets.
Meltzer (1999) tests for the impact of monetary pol-
icy actions on aggregate demand by estimating a
consumption function in which both short-term real
interest rates and real money balances appear.
Arguing that prices are relatively sticky in the short
run, Meltzer finds that, even after accounting for the
effect of the short-term real rate, movements in the
real monetary base exert a statistically significant,
independent effect on consumption.
Nelson (2000) also tests for the effect of changes
in real money balances on aggregate demand using
data from the United States and the United Kingdom.
The data indicate that
money growth is directly
related to nominal income
growth and inflation.
Moreover, the evidence
suggests a weaker relation
between money growth
and real output growth 
in the long run.
42. The lone exception is Malta, where the correlation is 0.84. For all other countries, the correlation exceeds 0.90.
43. For a useful discussion of such policies and the inflation they engendered in the United States, see Mayer (1999).
44. Examples of recent studies employing such models include Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2000) and McCallum and
Nelson (1999), among others.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
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In contrast to previous findings (such as Rudebusch
and Svensson 2000), Nelson reports that deviations
in real output from its trend (or potential) are
explained by real short-term interest rates and real
monetary base growth. Nelson’s finding is important
because it demonstrates a direct, independent effect
of changes in monetary aggregates on aggregate
demand.45 Movements in the monetary base—an
aggregate over which the monetary authority arguably
has some control—thus affect the real economy in
the short run. Nelson argues that “when yields
besides the short-term rate enter both the IS and LM
relations, it is possible that real money growth might
be a valuable summary statistic for these yields and
might therefore contain information about GDP not
present in short-term interest rates” (2000, 18).46
This article tests for the independent effects
of real money balances on real output once the
TABLE 4
Detrended Output Regressions: M1
Country yt–1 yt–2 realt–1 realt–2 moneyt–1 moneyt–2 adjR2 DW
Canada 1.084 –0.297 0.710 1.85
(7.76) (1.86)
1.194 –0.387 –0.007 0.004 0.059 0.785 1.86
(7.36) (2.46) (3.67) (2.54) (1.23)
Chile 1.285 –0.659 0.799 2.53
(8.54) (4.43)
0.969 –.0387 0.001 0.210 0.821 2.43
(6.05) (2.43) (0.30) (2.15)
Denmark 1.112 –.0267 0.760 1.94
(8.31) (2.70)
1.231 –0.418 –0.002 0.107 –0.113 0.787 1.91
(7.55) (2.32) (1.20) (1.85) (2.01)
Japan 1.259 –0.390 0.847 1.93
(9.23) (3.19)
1.027 –0.256 –0.001 0.282 0.877 1.76
(6.34) (1.99) (0.70) (4.29)
South Africa 1.049 –0.450 0.588 1.86
(6.84) (3.32)
0.898 –0.327 –0.001 0.103 0.599 1.86
(5.01) (2.06) (0.70) (1.97)
Pakistan 0.884 0.768 1.64
(10.92)
0.856 0.002 –0.114 0.774 1.52
(9.56) (1.63) (1.84)
United States 1.155 –0.442 0.685 1.96
(8.31) (3.29)
1.030 –0.250 0.001 0.107 0.686 1.81
(7.62) (1.25) (0.42) (1.10)
Notes: All equations include a constant term. Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics based on White heteroskedasticity-
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effects of a real short-term interest rate have been
accounted for. Using Nelson’s approach, the follow-
ing equation is estimated:
(5) yt = a + biyt–i + cirt–i + dimt–i + et,
where y is deviations of real output from trend, r
represents the real rate of interest, m is real money
balances, e is an error term, and the terms a–d are
coefficients to be estimated. Nelson (2000) provides
a discussion of the underlying theory, which pre-
dicts that the expected sign on the real rate of inter-
est should be negative: An increase in the real rate,
if all other factors remain the same, should lower
aggregate demand. The expected sign on real
money balances is positive, suggesting that expan-
sionary monetary policy leads to a (temporary)
increase in real output growth above trend.
The paucity of data on short-term rates reduces
the sample to seven countries: Canada, Chile,
Denmark, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, and the
United States.47 As a first approximation, real inter-
est rates are calculated as the observed nominal
interest rate minus the actual rate of inflation. To
calculate the growth of real money balances, nomi-
nal money balances are deflated by the CPI, and the
logarithmic first difference of the series is calculated.
Finally, recent work focuses on the impact of real
rates and real balances on deviations of real GDP
from potential or trend values. Since measuring
potential GDP is difficult under the best of circum-
stances, this analysis measures the output gap as
deviations of real GDP from a quadratic trend.48
Table 4 reports the outcome from estimating
equation (5) for the seven countries when M1 is the
monetary aggregate used. Two regressions are
reported for each country. The first is a regression
of the output gap on its own lagged values. The lag
length reported is based on experimentation with
longer lag lengths, using only the last lag that
achieves statistical significance. In most instances
the significant lags are limited to the first two. The
second equation adds to this equation lagged values
of the real interest rate and lagged values of real
money growth.
The results generally indicate that lagged real
interest rates do not achieve statistical signifi-
cance. For example, the real rate is significant only
for Canada, and even there the cumulative effect is
quite small. Similarly, Nelson (2000) also reports
that the real rate is insignificant (and positive) for
the United Kingdom. These results do not support
the hypothesis that changes in the real rate of
interest explain movements in detrended output
growth. The results for lagged real M1 growth are
more positive, though not overwhelming. Across
the countries tested, this study finds that money
generally exerts a positive effect on detrended real
output for Chile, Japan, and South Africa. In two
instances, Denmark and Pakistan, the estimated
coefficients are counter to the theoretically expected
positive sign.49
Table 5 reports the results when M2 is used to
estimate equation (5). Switching to the broader
measure leads to money’s insignificance for Chile, in
contrast to the outcome found using M1. However,
switching to the broader measure produces a signif-
icant result for the United States. Overall, using M2
yields a significant monetary effect on the output
gap in Canada, Denmark, Japan, South Africa, and
the United States. In these five cases, an increase in
real M2 growth, all other things being equal, is asso-
ciated with an increase in the output gap.
These results are supportive of Meltzer (1999)
and Nelson (2000). It appears that changes in the
real money stock may significantly affect short-
term economic activity even after the impact of
changes in the real rate of interest is accounted for.
Moreover, it should be noted that the importance of
the real rate of interest is by no means supported in
these results. Though tentative, the results reported
here, especially using M2, do not support the widely
held opinion that money should play no role in mone-
tary policy.
45. There is literature that addresses the unresolved issue of whether real output is affected in the short run by changes in
money growth independently of changes in short-term interest rates. For recent studies of this issue and evidence sug-
gesting that there is a significant money-output link, see Hafer and Kutan (1997) or Swanson (1998) and the articles
cited therein.
46. Nelson (2000) provides a theoretical model in which the appearance of real money balances is justified as an explanatory
variable in the model. As he suggests (p. 28), real money balances act as a proxy for the effects of policy actions on the mul-
titude of yields that in all likelihood enter the aggregate demand and money demand functions.
47. The rates used for each country are the T-bill rate (Canada and South Africa), market lending rate (Chile), discount rate
(Denmark), call money rate (Japan and Pakistan), and the federal funds rate (the United States). All rates are from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.
48. This series is generated as the residual from a regression of log real GDP on time and time squared.
49. Although not reported, this analysis also tested for temporal stability in the extended equations. In all cases except Canada,
the calculated test statistics do not permit rejection of the hypothesis of stability. The break point tested is 1980.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
Conclusion
S
o what does remain of monetarism? Does
money matter? The evidence presented in
this article suggests that a blanket dismissal
of monetary aggregates as uninformative for policy
decisions is premature. The data from a variety of
economies indicate that money growth is directly
related to nominal income growth and inflation.
Moreover, the evidence suggests a weaker relation
between money growth and real output growth in
the long run. These findings change as the time
horizon moves from annual to multiyear averages.
But the pattern is what monetarism suggests
should occur, in keeping with its foundation in the
quantity theory. While these results do not support
a version of monetarism in which short-term
manipulation of the monetary aggregates delivers
direct and precise control over movements in
TABLE 5
Detrended Output Regressions: M2
Country yt–1 yt–2 realt–1 realt–2 moneyt–1 moneyt–2 adjR2 DW
Canada 1.084 –0.297 0.710 1.85
(7.76) (1.86)
1.171 –0.396 –0.008 0.004 0.034 0.776 1.86
(6.34) (2.20) (3.32) (2.79) (0.32)
Chile 1.285 –0.659 0.799 2.53
(8.54) (4.43)
1.235 0.640 0.001 0.073 0.780 2.42
(5.76) (3.89) (0.11) (0.28)
Denmark 1.112 –0.0267 0.760 1.94
(8.31) (2.70)
1.113 –0.278 –0.002 0.144 0.779 1.81
(7.26) (1.56) (1.22) (2.12)
Japan 1.259 –0.390 0.847 1.93
(9.23) (3.19)
1.241 –0.373 –0.002 0.409 –0.238 0.886 1.95
(10.07) (3.20) (0.84) (4.57) (2.12)
South Africa 1.049 –0.450 0.588 1.86
(6.84) (3.32)
0.736 –0.185 –0.001 0.361 0.660 1.79
(5.31) (1.43) (0.83) (3.39)
Pakistan 0.884 0.768 1.64
(10.92)
0.855 0.002 –0.084 0.776 1.56
(8.98) (1.42) (1.26)
United States 1.155 –0.442 0.685 1.96
(8.31) (3.29)
0.728 0.155 0.001 0.435 0.796 1.69
(5.24) (0.77) (1.13) (4.79)
Notes: All equations include a constant term. Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics based on White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors.31 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2001
income and prices, they also do not reject the
notion that changes in money growth have impor-
tant effects on the economy. Failure to acknowledge
this empirical fact could give rise to undesirable
policy consequences, as evidenced by the inflation
of the 1970s or the dramatic and deep recession of
the early 1980s.
If one is skeptical about the role of money and
prefers interest rates as the key policy tool, the
results presented here do not provide overwhelming
support for that position. It appears that there is
more likely to be a short-run response of real output
to a change in money growth than a change in real
interest rates. Of course, these estimates are based
on only one measure of the real rate, but the out-
come is similar to Nelson’s (2000) more rigorous
analysis. Together, his results and those in this
study do not provide much empirical support for the
use of interest rates as key policy variables to
achieve stable economic growth.
The results presented here signal a call for con-
tinued research into the links between money and
the economy, the assessment of existing and new
measures of the money aggregates, and the role that
money should play in policy. In the end, it appears
that quite a bit of monetarism remains.
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